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Chapman University University of Alabama Chapman University
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April 8, 2019
Abstract
We explore if fairness and inequality motivations affect cooperation in indefinitely
repeated games. Each round, we randomly divided experimental participants into
donor-recipient pairs. Donors could make a gift to recipients, and ex-ante earnings
are highest when all donors give. Roles were randomly reassigned every period,
which induced inequality in ex-post earnings. Theoretically, income-maximizing
players do not have to condition on this inequality because it is payoff-irrelevant.
Empirically, payoff-irrelevant inequality affected participants’ ability to coordinate
on efficient play: donors conditioned gifts on their own past roles and, with inequal-
ities made visible, discriminated against those who were better off.
Keywords: cooperation, experiments, indefinitely repeated games, social dilemmas.
JEL codes: C70, C90, D03, E02
1 Introduction
There is a view that inequality—in opportunity, income, and wealth—undermines
the long-run prosperity of a nation (Stiglitz, 2012). Two possible channels
have been identified. One is purely economic: inequality creates distortions
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in capital and labor markets, which result in resource misallocation and effi-
ciency declines (Aghion and Williamson, 1998; Piketty, 2014). The other is
behavioral: inequality erodes cohesion and trust in society, which harms pros-
perity by undermining norms of cooperation and prosocial behavior (Putnam,
2000). We focus on this second channel, which has not been investigated very
extensively; the impact of fairness and inequality motivations is still largely
unexplored in the literature on long-run cooperation and social norms. We
contribute to filling this gap through an experiment based on the theory of
repeated games (or, supergames); see Table 1.
Table 1: Related experimental literature
One-shot/Finite Supergames
Equality X X
Inequality X This study
In the experiment, a group of four subjects interacts as strangers. The
game consists of an indefinite sequence of “helping games” in ever-changing
pairs (Camera et al., 2013). In each pair, one party (the donor) is given
the option to cooperate by providing a large benefit to the counterpart (the
recipient), at a modest personal cost. The alternative is to defect by remaining
idle, which grants modest and slightly unequal payoffs to both. This gives rise
to a social dilemma because, though cooperation is socially efficient, a short-
run temptation may exist to free ride by defecting.
A key design feature is that individuals switch from one role to the other
at random. In each round, a virtual coin flip determines who is the donor in
the pair. This random role assignment amounts to an uncontrollable shock to
earning opportunities. It ensures equal opportunity ex-ante but not ex-post
since, as the game progresses, someone may be a donor more often than others.
These differences in past roles (or, opportunities) are the exogenous source of
uncontrollable inequality. This kind of inequality is payoff-irrelevant because
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it neither modifies the power structure in the game, nor alters the expected
return from cooperation—which is independent of past opportunities.
In this game, efficient play is incentive-compatible if individuals adopt a
norm of mutual assistance supported by a “grim” trigger. Every player should
cooperate whenever she can, with anyone she meets, independent of the distri-
bution of past roles. If anyone breaks this norm, then the players will cease all
cooperation, effectively triggering the worst equilibrium (Abreu et al., 1990;
Ellison, 1994; Kandori, 1992). This norm ensures 100% efficiency (ex-ante and
ex-post) and guarantees equal and maximal ex-ante payoffs. Hence, under
an efficiency criterion, full cooperation is a focal outcome. But efficient play
cannot guarantee equal payoffs ex-post because some players may be frequent
recipients who enjoyed more of the cooperation benefits while shouldering less
of its costs (advantaged players), while the reverse holds true for others (dis-
advantaged players). According to the theory of repeated games, variation in
past roles should not affect the structure of incentives, so income-maximizing
players do not have to condition their choices on information about past roles
or earnings. But if individuals are driven by a mix of motives, including fair-
ness or inequality aversion, then they might act upon such information.
Our first contribution is to document that variation in past roles hindered
coordination on efficient play. Donors conditioned their choices on their own
past roles, acting less cooperatively when disadvantaged. This reveals that
payoff-irrelevant inequalities interfered with the incentives for cooperation,
undermining coordination on efficient play. Second, we show that disclosing
information compounds this problem. In a treatment, prior to choosing, we
informed donors of how their past opportunities compared to the recipient’s.
This information made salient inequalities in past roles without theoretically
altering the structure of economic incentives compared to the no-information
treatment. It neither revealed past conduct or future intentions, nor expanded
the payoff set, nor disclosed identities. Empirically, disclosing information on
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past roles in the group affected behavior and cooperation. Donors conditioned
their choices on the past roles of their counterparts, discriminating against
recipients known to be advantaged in terms of past opportunities. We also
see a greater inclination to unilaterally break a norm of mutual support by
defecting even if no one else in the group had yet done so. This may reflect
players’ attempts to raise their own payoff to counteract unfavorable past op-
portunities. Yet, this behavior backfired because people reacted to defections
by permanently lowering their cooperation rate. As a result, realized efficiency
and coordination on efficient play declined as compared to the treatment where
payoff-irrelevant inequalities remained hidden.
Since inequalities in past roles are positively correlated with inequalities in
past earnings, as a robustness check we also investigate the case where past
earnings inequalities are made explicit. In two additional treatments, before
taking an action, donors could compare the running total of their earnings to
the recipient’s. Earnings information is crossed with role information result-
ing in a two-by-two design. Here, too, we see a decline in pro-social behavior
as compared to the no-information treatment. Donors actively discriminated
against more fortunate players, and were also less likely to stick to a cooper-
ative norm when no one else had defected. However, we also see an increased
desire to help the less fortunate, so that, although coordination on efficient
play suffered, there is a minor decline in realized efficiency. The fact that
payoff-irrelevant shocks affected behavior in our experiment suggests care is
needed when introducing exogenous variation in laboratory supergames (e.g.,
see Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). The message is that ran-
dom elements of the design may affect the incentives for cooperation biasing
the results in theoretically unanticipated ways. This has two distinct possi-
ble implications. The first one concerns economic policies that are inherently
redistributive, such as fiscal policy. The experiment suggests such policies
should be evaluated not only in terms of their effectiveness at meeting the pol-
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icy objectives, but also their potential impact on society’s cohesion. A second
potential implication concerns the social impact of inequality. Much of the
economics literature has focused on inequality’s potential to lower society’s
welfare by misshaping the structure of economic incentives. Our study sug-
gests that inequality alters economic behavior even when it leaves the economic
incentives unaltered, as it inhibits individuals’ pro-sociality and cooperative
attitudes.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses the related experimental litera-
ture. Section 3 describes the design. Section 4 presents theory and hypotheses.
Section 5 reports the results. Section 6 offers some final considerations.
2 Related studies
Our design is mainly related to experimental studies of cooperation with re-
peated play and, in particular, to indefinitely repeated social dilemmas, which
support a richer set of equilibria compared to games with one-shot or a com-
monly known number of rounds. These experiments have mainly focused on
fixed pairs facing a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2018). This
setup allows for reciprocity and it also ensures that earnings are equal under
full cooperation, ex-ante and ex-post, because subjects have identical opportu-
nities to give and receive benefits. By contrast, we adopt a design as in Camera
and Casari (2014); Camera et al. (2013), which rules out reciprocity through
random re-matching, and where efficient play cannot guarantee equal earnings
ex-post because subjects have random opportunities to give or receive benefits.
We extend this earlier design by informing subjects about differences in past
opportunities or realized incomes in the group, to determine if and how such
information about inequalities impacts cooperation and realized efficiency.
The experimental literature suggests that individuals do care about equal-
ity in outcomes, at least to some degree, in strategic settings where players
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face a social dilemma.1 Three features of our design differentiate it from
those in earlier experiments. On the one hand, earlier designs focus on games
that are one-shot or have a commonly known number of rounds. There, be-
havioral motivations cannot undermine the economic incentives to play effi-
ciently, because—unless one explicitly considers heterogeneity or introduces
social components in preferences—there are none, so efficient play is not part
of a Nash equilibrium (e.g., Anderson et al., 2006; Greiner et al., 2012; Gu¨th
et al., 2003). By contrast, we adopt an indefinite-horizon design that supports
a richer set of equilibria because—even if players are homogeneous and self-
interested—they can exploit the dynamic structure of the game to support
efficient play. Second, previous experiments focus on partners designs with
perfect information about past conducts, or with communication facilitating
coordination of play (e.g., Nishi et al., 2015; Tavoni et al., 2011). By contrast,
we adopt a design where individual past conducts are opaque and there is no
communication so efficient play cannot be incentivized through reciprocity, and
individuals must tacitly coordinate on a community-wide norm of cooperation
and of punishment. Third, inequality does not alter the return from efficient
play (e.g., as in Gangadharan et al., 2015; Sadrieh and Verbon, 2006) because
it is payoff-irrelevant. This allows us to decouple behavioral and economic
effects of inequality, to investigate if inequality that should not theoretically
alter behavior pushes subjects away from efficient play.2
Fairness and inequality have also been investigated in non-strategic dis-
tributive choice experiments where a disinterested third-party (a spectator)
must select a division of resources between two others. This research finds
support for “luck egalitarianism,” the notion that actions are meant to smooth
1There is a large literature about how to incorporate fairness and inequality aversion into
economic models (e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993)
and although our study is related to it, it is not an experiment about testing these models
in the lab (e.g., Blanco et al., 2011; Deck, 2001; Kagel and Wiley-Wolfe, 2001).
2In a bargaining experiment, Goeree and Holt (2000) find that differences in fixed payments
that should not theoretically alter behavior induce offers inconsistent with Nash equilibrium
but consistent with a fair division of final payments. See also Andreoni and Varian (1999).
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out outcome differences due to uncontrollable factors (Konow, 2000; Moller-
strom et al., 2015). In our study the role assignment is a form of uncontrollable
inequality and, although there are no disinterested spectators, we do find evi-
dence consistent with luck egalitarianism.
Finally, by manipulating the amount of information across treatments we
contribute to an experimental literature documenting how sometimes less, not
more, information is beneficial in market experiments and strategic bargaining
games (see Smith, 1994, p. 119) and also when the added information is theo-
retically irrelevant. For example, there is evidence that irrelevant information
can influence decision-makers through information overload (O’Reilly, 1977),
or by affecting inference judgments Troutman and Shanteau (1977). In our
study, information is payoff-irrelevant, cannot reveal past conduct or individ-
ual valuations, nor can it be used to build reputations. We find that the less
informed players are about the distribution of past earning opportunities, the
easier it is for them to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. This is not
predicted by the standard application of folk theorem-type results to groups
of strangers, as the efficient outcome is equally attainable in all informational
settings.
3 Experimental design
In our experiment, four subjects face an indefinite sequence of “helping games.”
Interaction in a round: In each round of the experiment subjects face a
helping game. Each game consists of a “donor” who is endowed with a good
and a “recipient” who values the good more than the donor. The donor faces
an individual decision problem: she can transfer the good to the recipient
(cooperate, C), or she can consume the good (defect, D). The recipient has no
endowment and no action to take. All framing in the experiment was neutral.
Round payoffs are in Table 2; instructions are in Supplementary Information.
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Table 2: Payoffs in a meeting (donor, recipient)
Donor’s choice
C D
0, 25 6, 4
If the donor chooses C, then the recipient earns g = 25 points, while the
donor earns nothing. Otherwise, both subjects earn a default payoff, which is
d = 6 for the donor and d−l = 4 for the recipient, so g > 2d−l > 0. Given this,
the donor’s dominant action is to do nothing. Cooperation is not mutually
beneficial but it maximizes surplus in the pair, so it is socially optimal. The
surplus from cooperation is g − (2d− l) = 15 points. The cost of cooperation
to a donor is the payoff difference 0 − d = −6; the cooperation benefit to a
recipient is her surplus g − (d− l) = 21; hence the benefit/cost ratio is 3.5.
Baseline session and supergame: A session involved 16 subjects in the lab
at the same time, all exposed to the same treatment, which was chronologically
divided into five distinct supergames. In a supergame, subjects interacted for
an indefinite number of rounds in fixed matching groups of size four. Hence,
there were four concurrent supergames being played in a session. In each group,
subjects were randomly re-matched into pairs at the start of each round, so
there was a 1/3 probability of meeting the same person in two consecutive
rounds. Subjects did not know with whom they were paired nor did they
know who was in their matching group in any supergame.
Every round, in each pair the computer randomly assigned the recipient
role to one subject (“blue,” in the experiment), and the donor role to the
other (“red”), with equal probability. Hence, in every round half the subjects
where recipients and half were donors. The random assignment of roles is a
shock that affects the subject’s earning potential for the round because recip-
ients have a superior earning potential (25 points vs 6 points). This shock
ensures equal economic opportunity going forward because the payoff matrix
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and role assignment process are fixed. As a result, in a fully cooperative out-
come future earning prospects are identical across individuals and rounds, and
are completely unaffected by differences in past roles. Yet, the random assign-
ment of roles provides an exogenous source of variation in cumulative earnings,
and so it is likely to generate unequal economic results over the course of the
supergame. As the supergame progressed, some participants could be advan-
taged, having been recipients more often than others (disadvantaged), thus
having more chances of getting the higher payoff of 25 if cooperation occurred.
The duration of the supergame was uncertain because it was determined by
a random continuation rule (Roth and Murnighan, 1978). A supergame began
with 15 fixed rounds after which successive rounds occurred with probability
β = 0.75. This continuation probability can be interpreted as the discount
factor of a risk-neutral subject. A priori, the expected duration of a supergame
was 18 rounds because from round 15, in each round the supergame is expected
to last 3 more rounds. At the end of each round a computer drew an integer
number between 1 and 100 with equal probability, which was then revealed to
all subjects. A draw equal to or below 75 informed subjects that the supergame
would continue (otherwise, it would end).3
At the end of each round, subjects observed whether or not the outcomes
were identical in both pairs of their group. This form of anonymous public
monitoring allows public detection of deviations from a social norm, and it
could also simplify coordination tasks, but it does not allow agents to identify
opponents (see screenshots from instructions in Appendix C). Hence, because
individual histories remained private, subjects could neither build a reputation
nor engage in relational contracting. Public monitoring ensured that the min-
imum discount factor supporting full cooperation in equilibrium was invariant
across treatments (see next section).4
Supergames terminated simultaneously for all concurrent groups. After
3This number could also serve as a public coordination device, at the group level.
4Subjects had access to a record of their own past outcomes, and also had pen and paper.
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each of the first four supergames, subjects were placed into new four person
matching groups and began playing another supergame. Matching groups
were constructed so that no one was ever in a group with someone else more
than once, a perfect strangers design. Subjects were aware of this fact and,
as a result, we have twenty unique groups per session. At the conclusion of
a session, one supergame was selected randomly (Sherstyuk et al., 2013) and
subjects were paid based upon their earnings in that supergame at the rate
of $0.20 per point. The specifics of the procedural details are discussed in
Appendix A. Here we note that the experiment involved 16 sessions and 256
subjects with average salient earnings of $27.00 per subject; see Table 3.
Other treatments: We adopt a 2x2 design where one factor is the donors’
knowledge of relative past roles and the other is knowledge of relative past
earnings. In all treatments the socially optimal outcome is an equilibrium,
subjects cannot build reputations or engage in reciprocity, and past actions
cannot affect future opportunities or feasible outcomes; see Table 3.
Table 3: Overview of the four treatments and the sixteen sessions
Treatment
Variable Baseline Roles Wealth History
Blue Index No Yes No Yes
Earnings Index No No Yes Yes
Subjects/Sessions 64/4 64/4 64/4 64/4
Superg./Avg. rounds 80/18.5 80/18.4 80/18.5 80/19.6
Salient $ Earnings
average 26.38 25.94 25.00 30.08
min, max 8.75, 54.00 6.50, 55.50 9.25, 54.00 10.00, 54.00
In the Roles treatment, donors observed explicit information about past
roles before making their choice. At the start of every round after the first, we
calculated the proportion of past rounds in which each subject was a recipient.
Before making a choice, donors observed the normalized recipient rate for each
group member. This information was called the “blue index” as it measures
how often players had been in the blue role. Index values masked identities
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and preserved anonymity because they were not associated with individual
identifiers, and were unobservable to recipients.5 Unequal blue indices give rise
to inequality in past earnings, especially in cooperative groups, given the large
point spread. Hence, as a robustness check we ran two additional treatments.
In Wealth, donors observed the distribution of the subjects’ running total of
points earned (wealth). Since the mean value varied from round to round, this
information was presented in relative form, with the mean index normalized to
100 (“earnings index”). A donor observed her own relative wealth, that of the
matched recipient, and of the other two group members. In History, donors
saw both the “blue” and the “earnings” indices.
Remarks: In all treatments there is “equal opportunity.” Players’ ex-ante
earnings potential is governed by a payoff matrix and a role assignment pro-
cess that are fixed, identical across players, and independent of past roles and
actions. Ex-post inequality in roles is thus payoff-irrelevant. Adding the in-
dices expands the strategy set—as donors can condition their choice on the
provided information in earlier rounds—but neither expands the action set
relative to the no information Baseline, nor affects payoffs in the stage game.
With high levels of inequality in an index, a donor might be able to de-
termine if they previously met that person only as a recipient-counterpart,
but not as a donor-counterpart—thus preventing direct reciprocity. Moreover,
since indices do not disclose information about actions undertaken by that
person, they make past conduct opaque and hinder reputation-building. The
“blue index” prevents reputation-building because role assignment is indepen-
dent of past conduct and the donors’ index is hidden from recipients. The
“earnings index” might offer a noisy reputation signal, as it is correlated with
past conduct. If so this allows targeting punishment to specific individuals;
e.g., high-wealth players, if high-wealth is considered statistical evidence of
5The donor observed her blue index, the paired recipient’s index, and the index of the two
others in a random order. To facilitate comparisons, the average relative frequency of 0.50
was normalized to 100, so a value of 100 + x indicated a x% departure from the average.
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free-riding behavior. It is thus conceivable that the information provided in
Wealth and History facilitates coordination on efficient play as compared to
the other two treatments, by allowing identification and sanction of free-riders
without requiring coordination on the grim, community punishment.
Full cooperation supports income inequality ex-post because the realized
sequences of donor and recipient roles inherently vary across subjects, over
time. These disparities are an exogenous source of earnings variation in the
experiment, which is uncontrollable and does not alter the structure of eco-
nomic incentives because it does not affect continuation payoffs in the efficient
equilibrium. In a cooperative group it is the only source of earnings variation.
Yet, ex-post income or roles inequality cannot alter the power structure in
the game as high-income players have no greater control over the earnings of
others than low-income players.
4 Theoretical considerations
In our setup, full cooperation is efficient and benefits everyone. To demonstrate
that groups can attain this outcome, we employ standard arguments from the
theory of supergames, showing that players can exploit anonymous public
monitoring to build an incentive-compatible rule of cooperation supported by
a punishment convention that is triggered if the rule gets broken.
A theoretical premise is that players are risk-neutral and payoff-maximizing,
where payoffs correspond to players’ expected earnings. Payoffs can be calcu-
lated at the start of any round, as the present value of the anticipated stream
of earnings in the continuation game, using the continuation probability β as
the discount factor. Payoffs are thus ex-ante measures of performance that
only include future anticipated earnings, and should not be confused with ex-
post measures including performance in past rounds (e.g., total earnings in
the game). Inequalities in past roles or incomes are thus theoretically payoff-
irrelevant: they can neither affect the earnings matrix in Table 2, nor the
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matching or role assignment processes in future rounds. It follows that though
variation in past roles or incomes affects total earnings in the game, it does
not affect the theoretical structure of incentives of payoff-maximizing players.
To begin the analysis, start by observing that defection is the unique Nash
equilibrium in a one-shot interaction because cooperation is costly to a donor.
It follows that full defection is a sequential Nash equilibrium because it con-
sists of an indefinite repetition of the one-shot Nash equilibrium. However,
payoffs are minimized under full defection. Instead, full cooperation maxi-
mizes payoffs. Full cooperation can be supported as a (sequential) equilibrium
if a subject cooperates from the beginning of the game whenever she is a donor,
but switches to defection forever after someone defects (Kandori, 1992, Propo-
sition 1). When everyone adopts this strategy, then we say that cooperation
is a social norm. Here, any defection is punished with permanent defection by
the entire group.
Proposition 1. In the experiment, the equilibrium set includes full cooperation
& full defection.
Cooperation is an equilibrium when two conditions apply: in equilibrium,
every donor prefers to choose C; out of equilibrium no donor prefers to chose C.
The latter condition is immediately verified: once someone moves off equilib-
rium, that deviation is publicly observed. Hence, every donor defects thereafter
and there is no longer an incentive to cooperate. The first condition requires
checking that a donor cannot improve her payoff by moving off equilibrium
(unimprovability criterion). In Appendix A we prove that this is the case as
long as players are sufficiently patient, if β ≥ β∗ := 2d
g + l . In the experiment
β∗ = 4/9, and since the continuation probability of the game corresponds to
β = 0.75 under risk neutrality, cooperation is an equilibrium in every treat-
ment.6 The threshold value β∗ is the ratio between the cost of cooperation for
6Full cooperation cannot be ruled out as an equilibrium under empirically reasonable risk
aversion. The coefficient β∗ depends on the assumption of linear preferences. One can
show that with CRRA preferences of the type u1−γ/(1 − γ) full cooperation remains an
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a donor d and the surplus difference g + l2 expected next round.
If cooperation is a social norm, then strategies and therefore payoffs are
independent of uncontrollable inequalities in past roles or incomes, both in- and
off-equilibrium. Considering for simplicity rounds when the random stopping
rule has already begun (for general rounds see Appendix A), for any realization
of past roles, the equilibrium payoffs to donor and recipient are, respectively,
a+ β(g + a)2(1− β) and g +
β(g + a)
2(1− β) .
Off-equilibrium, instead, there is full defection so for any realization of past
roles donor and recipient’s payoffs are d+ β(2d− l)2(1− β) and d− l +
β(2d− l)
2(1− β) .
Proposition 2. Adding inequality indicators eliminates none of the Baseline
equilibria, and does not expand the set of equilibrium payoffs. Conditioning on
indicators is neither necessary nor sufficient to attain efficiency.
The possibility to condition behavior on inequality indices increases the set
of available strategies compared to Baseline, hence can alter the equilibrium
set. However, adding inequality indices cannot eliminate any of the equilibria
possible in Baseline since players can always rely on strategies that ignore
inequality indices. Moreover, adding inequality indices does not expand the
set of equilibrium payoffs because the efficient outcome is an equilibrium in
Baseline. The use of conditional strategies is not necessary to sustain full co-
operation because defections are publicly revealed, so the efficient outcome can
be attained in all treatments by exploiting anonymous public monitoring. The
use of conditional strategies is not sufficient for efficient play because the in-
dices mask the identity of counterparts, cannot be used to signal a cooperative
intention, and do not reveal individual past conduct.
equilibrium if γ ≤ 0.37. Estimates of CRRA coefficients vary widely depending on many
factors; in experiments with a fixed recruitment fee, such as ours, we find a coefficient of
0.34 (Harrison et al., 2009), while in experiments with low stakes 60% of subjects lay below
0.41 (Holt and Laury, 2002).
14
Summing up, players can maximize their prospective payoffs by adopting
a strategy that threatens a switch to uncooperative behavior in response to
defections. The structure of incentives remains unaltered as we add the payoff-
irrelevant information offered by the blue and earnings indices. Hence, there
is no obvious reason to expect different behavior across treatments. Condi-
tioning actions on information about past roles or earnings does not enhance
prospective outcomes. Payoff maximizing players can easily coordinate on
efficient play in all treatment by relying on public monitoring of defections
in their four-person group. Conditioning actions on a (privately observed)
statistic about past roles or earnings does not go in the direction of facilitat-
ing coordination on cooperation, and in fact may only contribute to increase
coordination complexity. We thus put forward three testable hypotheses:
H 1. Donors should condition actions on past play.
H 2. Donors should not condition actions on own past roles/incomes.
H 3. Donors should not condition actions on others’ past roles/incomes.
If, instead, inequality concerns matter, then individuals may condition ac-
tions on past roles/incomes.
The requirement β ≥ β∗ is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a
cooperative equilibrium, but there is no guarantee that full cooperation will
emerge instead of a lower-efficiency equilibrium. Equilibrium selection is an
open question because many other equilibria exist with efficiency degrees be-
low 100%. So why should we pay particular attention to full cooperation?
First, it is Pareto dominant and so it is a natural equilibrium to coordinate
on, for income-maximizing players. Second, the grim strategy is risk dominant
in the experiment (see proof in Appendix A), so strategic uncertainty has less
of a bite. Third, experiments on indefinitely repeated social dilemmas reveal
that subjects tend to select play that aims for efficiency not only in fixed-pair
designs (Camera et al., 2013), but also under random-matching design with
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non-anonymous public monitoring (Camera and Casari, 2009); there is no rea-
son to believe this tendency should shift under anonymous public monitoring.
Fourth, previous experiments on helping games reveal that subjects who have
sufficient exposure to the game, and access to institutions that minimize ex-
ploitation risks, tend to coordinate on efficient play even in much larger groups
(Bigoni et al., forth.).
5 Results
This section starts by documenting behavior when inequalities remained hid-
den (Baseline treatment), proceeds by studying behavior when past roles
were revealed (Roles treatment), and finally discusses the robustness of these
findings to revealing wealth inequalities (Wealth and History treatments).
Throughout this section we will refer to Table 4 below, which provides an
aggregate view of average cooperation in the groups across treatments and
supergames. By design, realized efficiency in a group corresponds to the mean
cooperation rate of in the group.
Table 4: Average Cooperation and Coordination on Cooperation
Supergame Coordination on C
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 Overall t=1 ≤20% ≥80% 100%
Baseline 0.44 0.51 0.62 0.67 0.62 0.57 0.63 9 21 10
Roles 0.31 0.49 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.48 0.59 14 11 2
Wealth 0.38 0.51 0.49 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.53 12 12 4
History 0.42 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.51 0.51 0.62 10 13 1
Notes: 1 obs. = four-person group in a supergame (N=80 per treatment). Supergame
columns: average proportion of cooperative choices in a supergame (the standard errors,
which are not reported, vary between 0.04 and 0.08). t=1 column: average cooperation in
round 1 of all supergames. Coordination on C : number of groups that attained a given co-
operation level. Only one group achieved 0% cooperation (supergame 1, Wealth treatment).
Consider the Baseline sessions in which inequalities remained hidden.
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Result 1. In Baseline, average cooperation increased with experience. No
group coordinated on the inefficient equilibrium, and 10 in 80 groups coordi-
nated on the efficient equilibrium.
Evidence is provided in Tables 4 and 5. In Baseline, the average coop-
eration rate in a supergame lies between 44 and 67 percent. Cooperation
significantly increased as subjects gained experienced with the task. Table 5,
reports marginal effects on the cooperation rate in the average group from a
regression on Baseline data.7
Table 5: Cooperation in Baseline: Marginal Effects
Dep. variable: Coefficient S.D.
Cooperation rate
Supergame 0.058*** (0.014)
Controls
Male -0.053 (0.063)
Duration -0.047*** (0.016)
Previous duration 0.002 (0.012)
Response Time -0.059** (0.024)
Incorrect Answers -0.006 (0.018)
Risk attitude 0.185*** (0.072)
N 80
Notes: GLM Regression: the dependent variable is the relative frequency of cooperation
in a group in a supergame (N=80 per treatment). Controls include standardized values of
supergame duration, current and previous (set to 18 rounds, in supergame 1), two measures
of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the quiz), and self
reported measures of sex and attitudes toward risk. Marginal effects are computed at the
mean value of regressors of continuous variables. Robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for
clustering at the session level. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
The regression includes a standard set of individual and other controls
(e.g., subject’s self-reported sex and duration of the supergame, see notes to
Table). It also includes a supergame regressor to trace how experience with
7For a continuous variable, the marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood to
cooperate for an infinitesimal change of the independent variable. For a dummy variable,
the marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood to cooperate for a discrete change
of the dummy variable from its base level (0).
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the task affects cooperation; its coefficient is positive and significant.8 This
evidence suggests that subjects do not frequently attain high efficiency levels
unless they are repeatedly exposed to the game; it is in accordance with data
from previous indefinitely repeated helping games (Camera et al., 2013) as
well as PD games in fixed pairs (Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette, 2018). It is in contrast
with the dynamics of cooperation observed under deterministic horizons, as in
that case cooperation tends to fall as subjects gain experience with the game
(Dal Bo´, 2005; Palfrey et al., 1994).
As our design admits multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria, it is possible that
the average cooperation rate observed is the result of different groups coor-
dinating on different equilibria. As an example, if 46 groups coordinate on
full cooperation and the rest on full defection, then we obtain 56 percent av-
erage cooperation. The data do not support this conjecture. About one in
four groups attained a cooperation rate of 80% or more, half of which fully
cooperated. By contrast, less than one in ten groups attained a cooperation
rate of 20% or less, and no group fully defected. A similar picture emerges
when we measure subjects’ cooperation rates, i.e., the proportion of coopera-
tive choices taken as a donor in a supergame. One in three subjects cooperated
every single time they were a donor, one in seven never cooperated, and the
majority of subjects falls somewhere in between (N=320). This suggests a
general tendency to seek high-payoff outcomes, but also an inherent difficulty
to coordinate on efficient play.
The data reveal that the payoff-irrelevant variation in past roles is partly
responsible for these coordination issues, because disadvantaged players were
less likely to cooperate. This impaired coordination on efficient play because
defections triggered a long-lasting punishment response.
8Cooperation increased over the first three supergames, and then stabilized. In a regression
with a factor variable tracing the impact of each supergame we can reject the hypothesis
that the coefficient on supergame 2 is statistically similar to those on supergames 4 and
5. All other pairwise coefficient comparisons indicate statistical similarity in coefficients
(p-value ranges from 0.541 to 0.829).
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Result 2. In Baseline, donors conditioned choices on past play, but also on
their own past roles.
The first part of Result 2 is consistent with the theoretical notion that
defections trigger a long-lasting sanction, and is in line with H1. The second
part is not, and leads us to reject H2. Figure 1 and Table 6 proved evidence.
Figure 1: Cooperation conditional on actions (right) and own past roles (left)
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Notes: One obs.=one donor in a round > 1, Baseline treatment. Each point is the average
proportion of cooperative choices in the supergame, with 95% confidence intervals.
We trace a subject’s roles history in round t > 1 of a supergame using the
blue index, which corresponds to the relative frequency of the subject’s past
recipient roles in that supergame. This frequency is the exogenous source of
variation in the experiment and it can be calculated in any treatment, even
when hidden from the subjects (as in Baseline). The average blue index is
set to 100 in each round. For t > 1, we classify a subject as disadvantaged
if she has a blue index strictly below the 100 average; otherwise, the subject
is advantaged. Based on this classification, we have four possible types of
meetings, depending on the classification of donor and recipient.9
9The inclusion of the cutoff point 100 in the advantaged definition implies we have less than
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The left panel in Fig. 1 reports the average cooperation rate of advantaged
and disadvantaged donors in Baseline supergames (initial round excluded).
Overall advantaged donors cooperated more than disadvantaged donors.
We ran a panel logit regression with random effects to determine if these
differences are statistically significant. The dependent variable takes value 1 if
the subject cooperated as a donor in a meeting, and is 0 otherwise. The panel
variable is a subject in a session and we consider all rounds in a supergame
after the initial one. In Baseline, donors could not observe individual histories
but could see outcomes in their group. To determine how players responded to
defections, we include dummy variables that trace the impact of observing D
in the group, on the subsequent probability of choosing C, as done in Camera
and Casari (2014). The Grim trigger regressor takes value 1 starting the round
after the subject directly experiences or observes a defection for the first time
(and is 0 otherwise). As subjects might delay their punishment response, we
also include four choice n dummy variables. The choice n dummy takes the
value 1 when the subject is a donor for the nth time after experiencing or seeing
the initial D in the group (0 otherwise).10
To determine if a donor conditioned actions on her own role history, we
include the factor variable Donor-Recipient Meeting to classify meetings based
on the advantage/disadvantage of donor and recipient (the exogenous source of
50% disadvantaged subjects in the data. Overall, 41% of subjects can be classified as disad-
vantaged and 59% as advantaged. For example, in round 9 of Baseline, the average subject
has been a recipient in 4 of the previous 8 rounds; a subject who was a recipient in less
than 4 rounds would have a blue index below 100 and would be classified as disadvantaged.
Table B2 in Supplementary Information reports the distribution of the four possible types
of meetings for all treatments pooled together.
10The sum of the coefficients on Grim trigger and each choice dummy identifies the average
donor’s reaction to a defection in her group, on the first and second occasion she had to
react. The Grim trigger coefficient captures the long-run response. Subjects made choices
at random points in time so these regressors trace an individual’s behavior on the first two
occasions in which she can make a choice, after suffering or observing an initial defection.
As subjects were donors on average every two rounds, this traces the subjects’ response
between two and four rounds after the defection. Empirically, the first opportunity to
react to an observed defection occurs, on average, in round 4. For a detailed discussion
on this econometric technique see Camera and Casari (2014).
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variation in the experiment). This can be done even if the information about
past roles was hidden from the subjects in this treatment. Based on this
classification, we have four possible types of meetings. The Donor-Recipient
Meeting regressor takes the value 0 if both donor and recipient were disad-
vantaged (meeting DD), 1 if the donor was disadvantaged and the recipient
was not (meeting DA), 2 in the reverse scenario (meeting AD), and 3 if both
were advantaged (meeting AA) which we take as the base in the regression.
Finally, we use a series of supergame dummies (supergame 1 is the base), a se-
ries of dummies to control for round-fixed effects, and we include the standard
set of individual controls. Table 6 reports the marginal effects on the donor’s
probability of cooperating.
Table 6: Past roles are hidden: marginal effects
Dep. var. =1 if C chosen Coeff. S.E.
Donor-Recipient Meeting
DD -0.063** (0.026)
DA -0.091*** (0.025)
AD -0.002 (0.018)
Punishment regressors
Grim trigger -0.303*** (0.046)
Choice 1 0.140*** (0.047)
Choice 2 0.093*** (0.036)
Choice 3 0.061** (0.031)
Choice 4 0.022 (0.028)
Supergame 0.023** (0.011)
N 2672
Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust stan-
dard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level (Baseline data only). De-
pendent variable = 1 if C chosen, 0 otherwise. One observation = choice of a donor in a
round > 1. Base case = donor and recipient are both advantaged (AA meeting). Controls
include round fixed effects through a series of dummy variables (a single dummy variable
for rounds 19 and above), duration of previous supergame (set to 18 rounds, in supergame
1), two measures of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the
quiz), and a self-reported measure of sex and risk attitudes. Marginal effects are computed
at the mean value of regressors of continuous variables. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The average donor conditioned her choice on past play in her group. Suf-
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fering or observing a defection led to a permanent decline in cooperation. The
Grim trigger coefficient is negative and highly significant, and the choice n
coefficients decline in n, indicating an increasingly negative response to de-
fections. The partial sums of Grim trigger and each Choice n coefficient is
negative and significant (Wald tests, not reported). Hence, we cannot reject
H1. However, in contrast with the arguments used to construct optimal strate-
gies of payoff-maximizing players, donors based their choices also on their own
role history. The coefficients on the DD and DA regressors are both negative
and highly significant; they are also statistically similar (two-sided Wald test,
p-value=0.142) and statistically different than the AD coefficient (two-sided
Wald tests, p-values < 0.001 each), which is insignificant. The similarity of
DD and DA confirms what we expected: in Baseline subjects cannot distin-
guish between advantaged and disadvantaged recipient, because past roles are
private information, so there should not be differences in behavior. This same
reason explains why AD is insignificant (AA is the base in the regression).
This is evidence that donors with infrequent past opportunities to receive
a benefit, cooperated significantly less than the rest. Hence, H2 is rejected.
An interpretation is that subjects acted to reduce their own exposure to unfa-
vorable earning opportunities due to past role assignments. They cooperated
less when they had few past chances to benefit from the cooperation of others.
This behavior is inconsistent with expected payoff maximization because, as we
have seen, subjects punish defections by cooperating less in subsequent rounds.
Hence, conditioning on own past roles can only reduce the future chances to
attain high-payoffs. The open question is what happens when donors can
compare their role history to that of others, before making a choice.
5.1 Past roles are observable
In Roles, donors saw the counterparts’ relative frequency of past roles (their
blue index) before making a choice. These disclosures made salient inequalities
in past role assignments, allowing easy interpersonal comparisons of relative
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positions (differences from a mean of 100). Yet, these disclosures do not alter
the incentives’ structure compared to Baseline as they neither reveal the coun-
terparts’ past conduct, nor their future intentions. If individuals are seeking to
coordinate on efficient play then, given standard theoretical arguments, these
disclosures should neither affect behavior nor outcomes. Payoff-maximizing
players should not condition their actions on the past roles of others (H3).
Result 3. In Roles, efficiency and coordination on full cooperation declined
relative to Baseline.
Support comes from Tables 4 and 7, concerning group-level analyses. Av-
erage cooperation is lower in Roles relative to Baseline in each supergame (see
Table 4). These cooperation differences are significant according to a regres-
sion similar to that in Table 5, which pools data from both treatments. The
marginal effects are reported in Model 1 of Table 7.
Table 7: Cooperation: marginal effects
Model 1 Model 2
Dep. var. = Coop. Full Coop.
Roles dummy -0.110* -0.103***
(0.059) (0.035)
Supergame 0.059*** 0.071***
(0.012) (0.008)
Controls Yes Yes
N 160 160
Notes: One observation is a group in a supergame (N=80 per treatment). Model 1: GLM
Regression; the dependent variable is the relative frequency of cooperation in a group.
Model 2: Logit regression; the dependent variable = 1 if group attained 100% cooperation,
0 otherwise. The regressions include interaction terms between treatment and supergame;
Controls include supergame duration, current and previous (set to 18 rounds, in supergame
1), two measures of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the
quiz), and a self-reported measure of sex and of risk attitudes. Robust standard errors (S.E.)
adjusted for clustering at the session level. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The regression includes a treatment dummy (Baseline serves as the base),
and a continuous supergame regressor to trace the effect of experience that
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is interacted with the treatment dummy. The Roles dummy is negative and
significantly different from zero (p-value=0.062). Full coordination on efficient
play is also less frequent in Roles than Baseline (2 vs. 10 groups). This
difference is statistically significant according to a logit regression. Model 2 in
Table 7 presents the marginal effects of a logit regression where the dependent
variable takes value 1 if a group fully cooperated (and 0 otherwise). The
coefficient on the Roles dummy is negative and significant (p-value = 0.004).11
What lies behind this cooperation decline? Earning opportunities (roles)
were randomly assigned by a computer program. Though this procedure guar-
antees ex-ante balance, there could still be ex-post imbalance in realizations.12
A conjecture is that donors acted more uncooperatively in Roles partly out of
a desire to reduce income inequality in their group. We find no support for
this conjecture. Coordinating on full defection, which minimizes per-capita
income, would have eliminated almost all income inequality because recipients
and donors’ round earnings are similarly low (4 vs. 6). Yet, no group did so in
the Roles treatment. Moreover, income inequality—as measured by the Gini
coefficient—was not lower in Roles than in Baseline (0.143 vs. 0.121).13
A second conjecture is that disclosing extant inequalities in past roles in-
fluenced behavior by making more salient any differences in past economic
opportunities. If so, then donors might have conditioned their choices not
only on their own past roles (as it happened in Baseline), but also on others’
past roles, pushing players further away from coordination on efficient play.
11The regressions account for the lack of independence within a session. Statistical analysis
based on aggregating data at the session level gives us only four independent observations
per treatment and is unsurprisingly inconclusive (data not reported).
12Table B1 in Supplementary Information reports statistics on inequality in opportunities
experienced by donors, and its evolution over the supergame.
13One observation is the Gini measure for one group in a supergame (N=80 per treatment);
income is measured as the average payoff of a subject in a supergame. Income exhibits
a higher degree of inequality than in counterfactual simulations were roles alternate as
in the experiment but choices are imposed. The average Gini for income is around 0.02
in the counterfactual full-defection outcome, and around 0.11 in the counterfactual full-
cooperation outcome.
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We find some support for this view.
Result 4. In Roles, disadvantaged donors discriminated against advantaged
recipients.
Evidence comes from Fig. 2 and a logit panel regression similar to the
one in Table 6. The dependent variable equals 1 if a donor cooperated (0
otherwise) in a round > 1. The regression allows us to study the effect of
this observable information on choices, because each donor-recipient pair is
categorized based on what subjects observed in the meeting, using the blue
index, as described before. The marginal effects are reported in Table 8.
Table 8: Past roles are visible: marginal effects
Dep. var. =1 if C chosen Coeff. S.E.
Donor-Recipient Meeting
DD -0.018** (0.009)
DA -0.064*** (0.024)
AD 0.002 (0.018)
Punishment regressors
Grim trigger -0.182*** (0.048)
Choice 1 0.072*** (0.027)
Choice 2 0.033 (0.021)
Choice 3 0.042** (0.020)
Choice 4 0.025 (0.028)
Supergame 0.037*** (0.006)
N 2680
Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust stan-
dard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level (Roles data only). Dependent
variable = 1 if C chosen, 0 otherwise. One observation = choice of a donor in a round
> 1. Base case = donor and recipient are both advantaged (AA meeting). Controls include
round fixed effects through a series of dummy variables (a single dummy variable for rounds
19 and above), duration of previous supergame (set to 18 rounds, in supergame 1), two
measures of understanding of instructions (response time and wrong answers in the quiz),
and a self-reported measure of sex and risk attitudes. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
As in Baseline, donors conditioned actions on their own role history. The
coefficients on the DA and DD regressors are both negative and significant.
Unlike Baseline, donors conditioned their cooperation also on the recipient’s
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visible history of past economic opportunities (something that could not be
done in Baseline). This can be ascertained through a series of two-sided Wald
tests. The DA coefficient is smaller than the DD coefficient (p-value=0.096),
suggesting discrimination against advantaged recipients.14 Thus, H3 is re-
jected. Note that providing information on past roles could have led advan-
taged donors to act more cooperatively with recipients known to be at a dis-
advantage, and less with those advantaged. However, this is not so: the AA
and AD coefficients are similar (p-value = 0.897), suggesting that advantaged
donors did not discriminate against advantaged recipients.15
Discriminating against advantaged recipients harmed cooperation because
donors switched to punishing after suffering or observing D; see the right panel
in Fig. 2. The coefficient on the Grim trigger regressor is negative and highly
significant, the sums of this coefficient and each of the Choice n coefficients
are also negative and significant (p-values 0.025, 0.012, < 0.001, and 0.008),
meaning that the cooperation decline was long-lasting, as seen in Baseline.
One can imagine that donors react less at the beginning of a game either
because a defection has not yet been observed, or because they anticipate that
an initial disadvantage can be overturned in the continuation game, or simply
because “bad luck” must be persistent to become salient to a subject in the
experiment. It is thus helpful to study the actions of donors in the initial
rounds of the game, when defections have not yet occurred. Contrasting the
Baseline to the Roles treatment provides an additional piece of evidence in
support of the view that revealing inequalities in past opportunities drove
14We also see that the coefficient on the AD regressor is statistically zero, which means
that donors behaved similarly in AA and AD meetings. One may think that advantaged
donors would have lowered cooperation with disadvantaged players, as a way to punish
for discriminating them. Our design hinders this kind of negative reciprocity. While
donors saw the recipient’s index, the converse is not true, which is probably a reason why
advantaged donors did not discriminate against the disadvantaged.
15In Roles, subjects also saw the past roles of the other two group members, but did not
condition on this information. When we add a covariate that controls for the donor’s
ranking in the distribution of roles (top, bottom or neutral), we find an insignificant impact
on the cooperation probability; see col. 2 in Table B3 in Supplementary Information.
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subjects away from efficient play.
Figure 2: Cooperation conditional on past actions
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Notes: One obs.=one donor in a round > 1, Baseline and Roles treatments. Each point is
the average proportion of cooperative choices in the supergame, with 95% confidence bands.
Left: no D experienced or seen in the group; Right: D experienced or seen in the group.
Result 5. Donors who neither suffered nor observed a defection cooperated
less in Roles than in Baseline.
Evidence comes from Fig. 2 and Table 9, which deal with individual-level
analyses. The left panel in Fig. 2 reports average cooperation rates for donors
who have neither suffered nor seen a defection in the group (other than their
own, possibly), in rounds after the first. The average cooperation rate is 0.78
in Baseline and it falls to 0.55 in Roles. This difference is highly significant
according to a panel logit regression (p-value<0.001, see Table 9), suggesting
that in Roles cooperation is more fragile: there is a greater reluctance to
conform to a norm of full cooperation, even if no one yet defected, as compared
to Baseline. By contrast, we do not see a greater tolerance to defections.
Defections led to a permanent decline in cooperation much it happened in
Baseline; see right panel in Fig. 2.
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Table 9: Choice when no defection observed or experienced: marginal effects
Dep. var.=1 if C chosen: Coeff. S.E.
Roles dummy -0.168*** (0.044)
Supergame 0.033*** (0.005)
Controls Yes
N 981
Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust stan-
dard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level. Dependent variable = 1 if C
chosen, 0 otherwise. One obs. = choice of a donor in a round > 1, Baseline and Roles data
only, in meetings where the donor has not previously suffered or seen a defection in the group
(other than their own, possibly). Controls include round fixed effects through a sequence of
dummy variables (one per each round 1-18 and one for rounds 19 and above), duration of
previous supergame (set to 18 rounds, in supergame 1), two measures of understanding of
instructions (response time and wrong answers in the quiz), a self-reported measure of sex
and of risk attitudes. The supergame regressor is interacted with the treatment dummy.
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Summing up, we presumed that people should act with the intent to max-
imize payoffs and coordinate on efficient equilibria. In fact, we documented
behavior that is not predicted by that theory because in our experiment indi-
viduals took actions that are inconsistent with efficient play. Donors with an
unlucky streak of past economic opportunities were less cooperative than oth-
ers. Second, revealing inequalities in past opportunities gave rise to discrim-
inatory strategies, with unlucky donors withholding cooperation from more
fortunate recipients. Third, revealing inequalities in past opportunities made
cooperation more fragile in the initial phase of the game. It is possible that
inequality or fairness concerns might have influenced choices: subjects might
have sometimes acted uncooperatively to reduce their exposure to unfavorable
realizations of past opportunities. Choosing D grants an immediate redistribu-
tion of earnings to a disadvantaged donor (6 points instead of 0 for the donor, 4
points instead of 25 for the recipient), but ultimately backfires because it trig-
gered a long-lasting cooperation decline that damaged the subject’s earning
prospects in the continuation game. Basing cooperation on past roles made
coordination on high expected-payoff outcomes more challenging, and led to a
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decline in realized efficiency.
5.2 Robustness: inequalities in earnings are observable
Disparities in past roles are a proxy for average earnings in the supergame (or,
wealth), as they strongly correlate with wealth in the data; the correlation
between wealth and the recipient frequency in the supergame is 0.37 in both
Baseline and in Roles (one observation is one subject in a supergame, N=320
per treatment). Here, we discuss two additional treatments where we examine
if the conduct observed in Roles is robust to making the distribution of past
earnings in the group explicit.
In Wealth, donors observe relative past earnings of everyone in the group
(earnings index). The History treatment combines this information with that
about relative positions in past roles (blue index). Providing this information
again interfered with establishing norms of long-run cooperation, although
there are mixed results about the overall impact.
Result 6. In Wealth & History coordination on the efficient outcome declined
relative to Baseline, but average cooperation was similar.
Supporting evidence is in Table 4 about group-level data, Fig. 3 about
individual-level data, and Table 10, which gives an overview of all treatment
effects. Table 4 reveals a decline in average cooperation and also in coordi-
nation on full cooperation, relative to Baseline. Regression analysis provides
evidence that the decline in full cooperation is generally significant, but not
the decline in average cooperation.16
16A regression based on Model 1 in Table 7, where the unit of observation is one group in
a supergame (N=80 per treatment), confirms this lack of significance; see column 1 in
Table B4 in the Supplementary Information. A logit regression based on Model 2 in Table
7 show a significant decline of full cooperation in the History treatment, but not in the
Wealth treatment; see column 2 in Table B4 in Supplementary Information.
29
Table 10: Treatment effects: p-values
Roles Wealth History
Group-level regression analysis
(a) Average Cooperation 0.062 0.461 0.337
(b) Full Cooperation 0.036 0.208 0.622
Individual-level regression analysis
(c) Cooperation when no D
seen/experienced < 0.001 0.079 0.043
Notes: (a),(b) Data from regressions in Tables 7 and B4 (1 obs. = one group); (c) Data
from regressions in Tables 9 and B5 (1 obs. = one individual in a round).
Defections triggered a decline in cooperation, much as it happened in Base-
line. Fig. 3 shows average cooperation for donors that did and did not suffer
or observed a defection in the group.
Figure 3: Cooperation conditional on past actions in Wealth and History
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Notes: One obs.=one donor in a round > 1, Baseline (included for comparison), Wealth
and History treatments. Each point is the average proportion of cooperative choices in the
supergame, with 95% confidence intervals. Left: no D experience or observed in the group;
Right: D has been experienced or observed in the group.
A regression reveals that there is a statistically significant switch to a per-
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manent punishment mode. The econometric model is the same as the one used
earlier because we use the blue index, which is a source of exogenous wealth
variation, as an instrument for the earning index (which is correlated with the
donor’s past actions); see Table 11.17 The regression also reveals that donors
conditioned their actions either on their own role history or that of others,
albeit with some differences across treatments.
Result 7. In Wealth and History, disadvantaged donors discriminated against
advantaged recipients; donors who neither suffered nor observed a defection
cooperated less than in Baseline.
Table 11 provides evidence of differences in cooperativeness between dis-
advantaged and advantaged donors. In both columns, the coefficients on the
DD and DA covariates are negative, and statistically different (two-sided Wald
tests, p-values= 0.051 and < 0.001 for columns 1 and 2). Since DA<DD, this
is evidence that disadvantaged donors discriminated against the advantaged.
Fig. 3 also suggests that revealing inequalities in past earnings made coop-
eration more fragile than in Baseline. Table B5 in Supplementary Information
provides evidence that donors who had not seen a defection in their group are
more likely to defect in Wealth and in History, as compared to Baseline. Over-
all, this is evidence that explicitly revealing the distribution of wealth in the
group impacted behavior and led to discrimination against the more fortunate
players, in contrast with H2 and H3.
Yet, with wealth explicitly revealed, we also see an increase in pro-social
behavior as compared to Roles. In History donors do not appear to con-
dition actions on their own past roles, if the recipient is known to be at a
disadvantage; the coefficients on DD and AD are statistically similar and in-
distinguishable from zero (two-sided Wald test, p-value= 0.189). Second, in
Wealth advantaged donors are more likely to cooperate with a recipient known
17In Table 11, the coefficient on the Grim trigger regressor is negative and highly significant,
the sums of this coefficient and each of the Choice n coefficients are also negative and
significant, meaning that the decline in cooperation was long-lasting.
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to be disadvantaged (the AD coefficient is positive and significant). An in-
terpretation is that making earnings inequalities explicit might have increased
the desire to help the less fortunate, which might explain why there no longer
is a significant decline in average cooperation as compared to Baseline.
Table 11: Past roles & cooperation: marginal effects (other treatments)
Dep. variable: Wealth History
=1 if C chosen Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Donor, Recipient meeting
DD -0.082** (0.034) -0.021 (0.022)
DA -0.115*** (0.036) -0.069*** (0.018)
AD 0.025** (0.012) 0.024 (0.021)
Punishment regressors
Grim trigger -0.204*** (0.069) -0.255*** (0.073)
Choice 1 0.102*** (0.038) 0.148*** (0.024)
Choice 2 0.065 (0.055) 0.126*** (0.026)
Choice 3 0.031 (0.047) 0.089*** (0.026)
Choice 4 0.030 (0.028) 0.050** (0.025)
Supergame 0.041*** (0.010) 0.012 (0.016)
Controls Yes Yes
N 2720 2856
Notes: Logit panel regression with random effects at the individual level and robust stan-
dard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level Column 1: Wealth data only;
Column 2: History data only. Dependent variable = 1 if donor chooses C, 0 otherwise. One
observation = choice of a donor in a round > 1. Base case = donor and recipient are both
advantaged (AA meeting). Controls include round fixed effects through a series of dummy
variables (a single dummy variable for rounds 19 and above), duration of previous supergame
(set to 18 rounds, in supergame 1), two measures of understanding of instructions (response
time and wrong answers in the quiz), and a self-reported measure of sex and risk attitudes.
The coefficient ranking is DA¡DD¡AD in column 1 and DA=DD¡DA in column 2: in both
columns the DD and DA coefficients are different (Wald tests, p-values= 0.051 and < 0.001
for columns 1 and 2); the DD and AD coefficients are significantly different only in column
1 (two-sided Wald tests, p-values= 0.004 and 0.189 for columns 1 and 2). Two-sided Wald
tests also allow us to establish that the partial sums of Grim trigger and each of the Choice
n coefficients is negative and significant. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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6 Discussion
Our experiment induced payoff-irrelevant inequality in groups of four individ-
uals playing a game with an uncertain ending. Random shocks—over which
players had no control—ensured equal future earning potential, while inducing
variation in past earning opportunities, and thus realized earnings. Inequalities
in past shocks could neither alter the power structure in the group, nor the fu-
ture earning potential or the expected return from cooperation. Theoretically,
income-maximizing players do not have to condition on these inequalities due
to past shocks because they do not alter the payoffs that can be earned in the
future (payoff-irrelevance).
Instead, the data lead to two broad observations. First, theoretically irrel-
evant shocks affected behavior in our laboratory supergames. This suggests
that a design with exogenous variation in tasks may affect the incentives for
cooperation in indefinite-horizon experiments, biasing the results away from
efficient play. Second, disclosing inequalities eroded norms of mutual sup-
port, impairing coordination on efficient play. We observe this even when we
added information about past earnings, which conceivably could have facili-
tated coordination on efficient play as high-wealth is correlated with free-riding
behavior. This provides some support to the notion that fairness or inequal-
ity motivations present an obstacle to a society’s cohesion and prosperity as
suggested in Putnam (2000). Field data offers ambiguous evidence on this
point as many institutional and environmental factors co-vary with economic
inequality. Reduction in social cohesion may stem from migration, not eco-
nomic factors; inequality may stem from a mix of factors (choice, luck, power,
ability) or may alter the return from cooperation. Our experiment controls
for these kinds of confounding factors.
In the experiment, subjects became less cooperative as a result of repeated
random assignment to the disadvantaged role; this conduct is inconsistent
with maximization of ex-ante payoffs in the experimental group. Inequal-
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ity disclosure gives rise to discriminatory behavior. This type of backward-
looking non-strategic behavior has not been documented before in experiments
on indefinite-horizon dilemmas, but it is consistent with results from finite-
horizon experiments (Loch and Wu, 2008; Sonnemans at al., 1999) and yet
quite puzzling because in our setup it crowded out Pareto-superior equilibria.
In our setting there is no clear economic incentive to depart from efficient play
by conditioning on past luck. Variation in past luck cannot alter the matrix
of earnings in a round and future assignment of opportunities, hence cannot
alter the equilibrium earning potential, which is always maximal under full
cooperation. In fact, defecting in response to bad luck is likely to backfire,
lowering the future earning potential if free-riding is sanctioned with future
defections (which is what happened in the experiment). Off-equilibrium there
is also no reason to condition on past opportunities because—presuming that
individuals wish to coordinate on efficient play—standard theoretical argu-
ments suggest that the threat of unconditional defection is the most effective
deterrent against free-riding.
So why did subjects modulate their cooperation on payoff-irrelevant in-
equalities? An interpretation is that they acted with the apparent intent to
counteract unfavorable past economic opportunities, attempting to equalize
ex-post payoffs in the face of randomness. But this kind of play did not pay
off in the experiment. Ex-post payoffs would have been much larger under full
cooperation for about 90% of subjects, and only slightly smaller for the rest.18
This lack of long-run perspective is also consistent with the view that disad-
vantaged donors—those who had infrequent past opportunities to benefit from
cooperative play—acted according to a “poverty mindset.” There is evidence
18We calculated counterfactual ex-post payoffs for each subject, under full cooperation and
full defection, using the realized sequences of roles. Full cooperation would have benefited
about 90% of subjects, roughly doubling their payoff (on average, 4.2 points/round gained
vs. 8.6 realized in the experiment—all treatments combined). The rest would have lost
1.3 points (vs. 11.4 points realized). Full defection would have generated a slight ex-post
payoff increment (0.8 points/round) for about 10% of players—those with especially long
donor sequences, and created a 4.4 points average loss for everyone else.
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that poverty causes stress and negative affective states, a mindset which leads
to short-sighted and risk-averse decision making (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014).
It is conceivable that disadvantaged donors might have internalized the feeling
of being poor in their experimental group, which in turn re-aligned their incen-
tives away from the long-term but risky gains made possible by cooperation,
toward the short-term and sure gains granted by defection.
Another interpretation is that fairness concerns might have dominated ef-
ficiency concerns—as documented in Gu¨th et al. (2003) for the case of one-
shot dictator games. Subjects might have been unwilling to follow a norm of
unwavering mutual support when the associated benefit did not reflect their
contribution to the prosperity of others, thus acting out of a desire to balance
their contribution to others’ prosperity and their own benefit. This behav-
ior is consistent with a “luck egalitarian” norm, according to which subjects
act to reduce a disadvantage due to uncontrollable factors (the random role
assignment in our case), as observed in non-strategic settings (Konow, 2000;
Mollerstrom et al., 2015). Finally, it is also possible that providing information
about past roles or earnings might have itself affected cooperation levels either
by causing an informational overload, or by affecting inference judgment.
In conclusion, we know from one-shot experiments that individuals may
be driven by a mix of motives, including fairness or aversion to inequality in
outcomes. Our experimental results suggest that these considerations apply
to indefinitely repeated laboratory supergames as well. It is conceivable that
equilibria exist in which defections are tolerated under certain circumstances
(e.g., being disadvantaged) but trigger punishment in others. If a norm of this
kind is indeed adopted, then this might explain the decline in coordination of
efficient play when past roles and earnings were disclosed. We see this as an
important direction for future work.
Provided that our findings scale up to larger economies, we offer two ad-
ditional insights. The first one concerns economic policy at the national and
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international level. A nation’s fiscal policy is inherently redistributive. Our
experiment suggests such policies should be evaluated not only in terms of
their effectiveness at raising revenue while mitigating market distortions, but
also their potential impact on society’s cohesion. This consideration can be
extended to the transnational domain of economic unions, where transfer poli-
cies are often justified by a mix of solidarity and efficiency-enhancing motives
(e.g., the “cohesion policy” of the European Union). Our study provides an
additional reason why, if countries have heterogeneous pre-existing economic
conditions, redistributing resources can benefit the entire economic area. A
second consideration concerns the social implications of inequality. Much of
the economics literature has focused on inequality’s potential to lower soci-
ety’s welfare by misshaping the structure of economic incentives, and hence
performance. Our study suggests that inequality alters economic behavior
even when it leaves the economic incentives unaltered (payoff-irrelevance), as
it inhibits pro-sociality and fosters discrimination. The study did not uncover
the ultimate causes of this influence on behavior (e.g., did envy play a role?)
and suggests that a more systematic approach is needed to make progress.
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Appendix A
Procedural Details
We recruited 256 subjects through announcements to the standing subject
pool for the Behavioral Business Research Laboratory at the University of
Arkansas. No subject had previous experience with this type of game in the
lab.19 After giving informed consent, subjects were seated at private terminals.
Neither communication nor eye contact was possible among subjects at any
time during the session. The experimenter publicly read the paper instructions
at the start of the experiment, a copy of which were then left on the subjects’
desks. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). On average, a session lasted 94 rounds for a running
time of about 120 minutes including instructions, a paid post-instruction com-
prehension quiz, and post-experiment payment. Average earnings were $27.00
per subject (min = $6.50,max = $55.50) excluding a $5 fixed participation
payment and an average of $2.10 (min = $.75,max = $2.50) from providing
correct answers to the comprehension quiz ($0.25 for each correct answer out
of 10 questions). Only one randomly selected supergame from the session was
paid and subjects knew this fact in advance.
Proof of Proposition 1
This analysis is based on the existence of equilibrium proof in Camera et al.
(2013). In each round t = 0, 1, 2 . . . individuals in the group are matched in
pairs, with uniform probability of selection. In each pair, a computer randomly
determines who is the donor and who is the recipient (with equal probability).
If cooperation (=Help) is the outcome, then g is the payoff to the recipient and
for generality let a denote the payoff to the donor. If defection (=Do nothing)
is the outcome, then d is the payoff to the donor and d − l to the recipient.
Round payoffs are geometrically discounted at rate β ∈ (0, 1) starting from
round n ≥ 0.
The equilibrium payoff (=expected lifetime utility) at t = 0 is
v(n) := (n+ 1)× g + a2 +
∞∑
j=1
βj × g + a2 =
g + a
2 ×
(
n+ 11− β
)
.
19About 55% of subjects were males, and the rest female. The subject pool is composed of
about 90% undergraduate students with the remainder being primarily graduate students
although some faculty, staff, and non-university associated people are in the pool. We
include sex differences as controls in the econometric analysis.
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A player is a donor or a recipient with equal probability in each round, hence
expects to earn g + a2 in each round. The payoff v(n) is increasing in n because
payoffs are discounted by β in rounds t ≥ n.
The equilibrium payoff in the continuation game starting on any date t ≥ 0,
before any uncertainty is resolved, corresponds to
Vt =

v(n− t) if t < n
v∗ := g + a2(1− β) if t ≥ n.
The equilibrium payoff of a donor at the start of any date t is
Vdt =
{
a+ v(n− t− 1) if t < n
a+ βv∗ if t ≥ n.
We must check that in equilibrium donors have no incentive to defect; out
of equilibrium, donors have no incentive to cooperate.
Defection is the dominant action off-equilibrium; i.e., it is always individu-
ally optimal to punish after a defection from equilibrium play is made public.
To see this suppose a donor deviates by cooperating off equilibrium. She would
earn a instead of d but her continuation payoff would not improve since ev-
eryone else keeps defecting—as prescribed by the rule of punishment. Since
d > a, it is optimal to punish off equilibrium.
In equilibrium, cooperation is a best response in every round t = 0, 1, . . .,
if Vdt ≥ Vˆdt. The left-hand-side denotes the payoff to a donor who cooperates;
the right-hand-side denotes the donor’s payoff when she moves off equilibrium
under a one-time deviation. Such deviation is publicly observed, hence—when
everyone follows the cooperative strategy—every donor will always defect in
the future. The payoff to the deviator is thus
Vˆdt =

vˆ(n− t) := d+ (n− t)2d− l2 + β
2d− l
2(1− β) if 1 ≤ t < n
vˆ∗ := d+ β 2d− l2(1− β) if t ≥ n
Now define
∆t = Vdt − Vˆdt = a− d+ g + a− 2d+ l2 ×

n− t+ β1− β if t < n
β
1− β if t ≥ n
42
The minimum value of ∆t is achieved for t ≥ n. The implication is that
cooperation is individually optimal in all rounds t whenever
β ≥ β∗ := 2(d− a)
g + l − a.
The grim strategy is risk dominant
Our game is sequential, does not have a two-by-two structure, and admits
more than two equilibria. Therefore, we consider a notion of risk dominance
that departs from the standard formalization in Harsanyi and Selten (1988),
but conforms to the heuristic argument that motivates it. A risk-dominant
equilibrium maximizes the expected payoff when players have uniformly dis-
tributed second order beliefs on the best and worst equilibrium (full coopera-
tion and full defection). We also add structure to beliefs about strategies play,
by exploiting the dynamic structure of the game. In doing so, we employ the
technique in Bigoni et al. (forth.), to which we refer the reader.
Given random role alternation, the ex-ante expected payoff under full de-
fection equilibrium is denoted
vˆ := 2d− l2(1− β) .
The ex-ante expected payoff under full cooperation is
v := g2(1− β) .
Consider uncertainty over two competing strategies: “grim” (G ) and “always
defect” (AD). Initial donors select a strategy in round 1 and maintain it for
the rest of the supergame. Initial recipients take no action in round 1, so
we set them free to select G or AD in round 2. Given public monitoring,
conjecture that those who choose strategy in round 2 coordinate their choices
by best responding to the strategy play observed in round 1. If so, then
all uncertainty about future play is resolved at the end of round 1 as if initial
donors selected the equilibrium. G dominates AD after any history of play, for
those who choose their strategy in round 2 (weakly dominates AD, if someone
defected in round 1). Hence, if no-one (someone) defected in round 1, then
every donor will cooperate (defect) in every future meeting.
Consider round 1. There is strategic uncertainty because an initial pro-
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ducer is not sure what strategy the other initial producers will select. Suppose
that every initial producer believes that in round 1 there is probability p that
C is the outcome in any given pair; D is the outcome with the complementary
probability. A special case is p = 1/2, which may be motivated by the “prin-
ciple of insufficient reason” for a player who is unsure about what the others
will do. That is, the individual believes that the other initial producer plays
G with probability p, and AD otherwise. At the end of round 1 either C will
be the outcome in every future meeting, or D will be the outcome in every
future meeting.
Fix an initial donor. Let denote VG and VAD the expected utilities from
choosing strategy G and AD where
VG = 0 + pβv + (1− p)βvˆ,
VAD = d+ βvˆ.
Consider VAD: the initial donor defects so all future donors will defect whether
or not they chose G or AD. Consider VG: with probability p the other initial
donor is also a grim player. In that case both cooperate and there is full
cooperation forever so the continuation payoff is βv. With probability 1 − p
the other initial donor plays AD in which case the continuation payoff is βvˆ
because full defection ensues. We say that G is risk dominant if VG ≥ VAD. If
p = 0.5, which is a standard consideration, this implies
β ≥ 4d
g + 2d+ l ⇒ β ≥ 0.62
Therefore grim trigger is a risk-dominant strategy in our experiment since the
discount factor is 0.75.
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